This paper addresses the issue of how regulators can use access pricing to promote entry by innovatory firms in the presence of essential facilities. The entrants have lower costs that spillover to firms in the market but the regulator is not able to distinguish which entrants have low costs and which do not. In a dynamic framework with entrants of differing quality technology spillovers have two effects. One is positive in that the incumbent can copy the cheaper technology of the entrant. This reduces cost in the industry and offsets the fixed entry cost associated with entry. The other is a negative effect in that the ability to use access pricing to deter entry of bad quality entrants is reduced. A low quality firm can free ride on the quality of a good entrant since it is protected from the consequences of its high costs and poor technology if a good firm has already entered or may be about to enter. The greater the spillover the greater the desire to attract good entrants but also the harder it is to penalise poor quality entrants. This paper considers this dilemma and the consequences for public policy. The question we address is whether the lack of full information encourages the regulator to sustain entry enhancing policies for longer or whether the regulator makes entry harder. Generally, we show that the incentives are for the regulator to limit entry enhancement in the face of incomplete information rather than be more open in the face of the inability to determine the good firms from the bad ones. We also show that for certain configurations the good firm has an incentive to raise its costs, i.e., become a less good competitor. 
Introduction
Optimal pricing for access to essential facilities has received considerable attention in recent years both from economists and policy makers throughout the world. This has focused mostly on network utilities but other issues such as access to ports have received regulatory attention. Recent interest has been driven in part by the wave of privatisations of network utilities around the world and international drive to open up network markets.
One of the most common access problems arises in networks where a service requires two legs, one a monopoly owned essential facility, and the other a potentially competitive segment. Suppliers other than the owner of the essential facility need to interconnect with the monopoly supplier and will generally be expected to contribute to the cost of the essential facility. The appropriate structure of this access charge has been the focus of signi¯cant debate within the economics profession. In basic models a Ramsey pricing rule, or sometimes a very simple version of this often referred to as the Baumol-Willig rule where the access charge is set at the marginal cost of provision plus the opportunity cost, is optimal (see, for example, Baumol and Sidak (1994) and Tirole (1994, 1996) ). Where there are issues such as network externalities or unregulated monopoly suppliers then there will be deviations from these rules (see, for example, the discussion in Economides (1996) ).
A feature of conventional access pricing rules is that they make entry di±cult. The potential entrant has to meet, in the form of an access charge, both the monopolist's marginal cost of the essential facility and the customer's contribution to the monopolist's common cost, and then cover the entrant's own cost before they can pro¯tably enter the market. Once one includes the up-front cost of entry it is often di±cult to compete in the presence of such an access pricing regime. At the same time is common for there to be a legal obligation on regulatory agencies to promote e®ective competition. This is the case in the European Union and within the framework of UK regulatory policy, where regulators have proved resistant to the implementation of conventional access pricing rules (see, for example, Grout (1996) ). These two positions can be reconciled if there are external e®ects.
(1) For example, new entrants may bring innovations which lower costs for all¯rms then positive entry assistance through lower access prices can be bene¯cial. This, however,
(1) See for example, De Fraja (1997 , 1999 .
1 raises questions such as how long should the entry assistance last. Furthermore, although a regulatory body may wish to reduce access charges to attract innovatory¯rms, in many cases it is di±cult for the regulatory body to distinguish, at least in the medium term, between the entrants that will be most bene¯cial and those that are less bene¯cial. Indeed, there is an inherent dilemma when pursuing e±ciency and wishing to promote competition.
In a dynamic framework with entrants of di®ering quality technology spillovers have two e®ects. One is positive in that the new technology of the entrant can be copied by the incumbent. This reduces cost in the industry and o®sets the¯xed entry cost associated with entry. The other is a negative e®ect in that the ability to use access pricing to deter entry of bad quality entrants is reduced. A low quality¯rm can free ride on the quality of a good entrant since it is protected from the consequences of its high costs and poor technology if a good¯rm has already entered or may be about to enter. The greater the spillover the greater the desire to attract good entrants but also the harder it is to penalise poor quality entrants. This paper considers this dilemma and the consequences for public policy. It complements the existing access pricing literature in that it focuses on issues that have not been addressed to date, in particular the limitations of simple access pricing in the presence of the spillovers in a game theoretic setting.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. There is a regulator, an incumbent that owns the essential facility and two potential entrants in the potentially competitive section of the network. The incumbent has a common cost between the two sections of the network. This favours monopoly provision but the two potential entrants have lower production costs and these spillover when they enter the market. The disadvantage of entry is that there is a¯xed one-o® entry cost per¯rm. The regulator sets a price cap which has to ensure that the incumbent can¯nance its activities (i.e. has non negative expected pro¯t in equilibrium) and then sets an access pricing regime which may encourage or discourage entry. There are two time periods, one of the¯rms arrive in each period and each has equal probability of being¯rst. We outline and discuss the subgame perfect equilibria of the model (technical proofs are omitted in this version) Section 3 of the paper considers the position when the regulator can observe whether the¯rst¯rm is the good one (i.e., lower production cost) or the bad one (i.e., higher production cost). In this case the regulator is able to implement the¯rst-best solution and we characterise this. The equilibria 'subsidise entry' to accommodate the spillover e®ect. There are four pro¯les that are optimal. Either the prices encourage early entry by the good¯rm but discourage late entry, encourage entry by the good¯rm at any time, encourage entry by the¯rst¯rm and discourage entry thereafter, or encourage entry by the good¯rm at all times and entry by the bad¯rm in the early period.
As indicated, the process of achieving¯rst-best by subsidising entry assumes that it is possible to observe whether entrants are good or bad¯rms. In general, it is more plausible to assume that the regulator is very unsure when setting the policy. For example, the UK telecommunications regulatory regime only allowed for one new entrant, Mercury
Communications plc, in the UK market for many years after the privatisation of British
Telecommunications. One can think of this as a very extreme version of our model. It was far from clear at that time whether Mercury was a good quality competitor. Indeed, ex post there are mixed views as to the quality of Mercury as a competitor in this period and the policy was eventually abandoned in favour of a more open one. Section 4 considers the model when it is not possible to identify whether the entrant is the good or bad¯rm.
The question we address is whether the lack of full information encourages the regulator to sustain entry enhancing policies for longer or whether the regulator makes entry harder.
We have mentioned above that when it is not possible to observe the types then the spillover e®ect makes it harder to use the access pricing structure to deter poor¯rms since a regime that wishes to attract a low cost¯rm given a high cost one has entered cannot prevent a high cost¯rm entering in the wake of the low cost¯rm since the spillover protects the bad¯rm from the consequences of its own ine±ciency. Similarly, a regime that wishes to attract a higher cost¯rm in the early stages cannot prevent a low cost¯rm earning a positive surplus should it be the¯rst in the market. This prevents the implementation of the¯rst-best. Generally, we show that the incentives are for the regulator to limit entry enhancement in the face of incomplete information rather than be more open in the face of the inability to determine the good¯rms from the bad ones.
Section 4 also addresses certain features of the equilibria. It shows that in the presence of imperfect information there are pro¯les which are superior to the implementible pro¯les but that they are not time consistent. More interestingly, it is shown that for certain con¯gurations the good¯rm has an incentive to raise its costs, i.e., become a less good 3 competitor. The intuition for this is that the regulator will not wish to encourage the high cost¯rm if its costs are signi¯cantly worse than the low cost¯rm. In this case the access pricing regime need provide no surplus to the good¯rm. In contrast, if the bad¯rm is not too ine±cient in comparison to the good¯rm then the optimal access pricing regime encourages entry by the high cost¯rm which implies that the low cost¯rm earns a positive expected surplus. That is, the informational rent of the good¯rm can be increased by reducing the extent of its superiority over the high cost¯rm.
The Basic Model
The model consists of a regulated market with one incumbent and two potential entrants. The market demand for the¯nal product is represented by a di®erentiable
The incumbent has control of the upstream part of the network which is an essential facility for access to customers.
The current state of technology available to the incumbent for provision of the downstream part of the network is a constant cost per unit. Each potential entrant to the downstream activity has a¯xed cost of entry, F . The two potential entrants di®er in their states of technology that they bring into the industry when they enter. Both costs are below the incumbent's cost per unit but one of the entrants, referred to as the good type, has the lowest cost technology and the other, referred to as the bad type, has a technology with costs between the incumbent and the good entrant. We use g and b as shorthand for good and bad types, respectively. For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that the incumbent's cost per unit is 1, the good entrant's cost per unit is 0 and the bad entrant's cost is c, 0 < c < 1. We assume that there is a complete spillover of technology. That is, the lowest cost technology in place in the market at any time can be copied costlessly by others in the industry.
The extensive form game of the model consists of an initiation stage and two subsequent periods. Formally, we can think of the initiation stage as one where the regulator sets a price cap, p, which the incumbent either accepts or rejects. If it is rejected, there is no production and the payo®s to all involved parties are identically zero. This formalises (2) The attraction of assuming a complete spillover is that it provides the richest set of outcomes and avoids having to decide on the form of market shares in a situation where there are di®ering costs and a binding price cap (see footnote 3). Subject to a resolution of this latter di±culty none of the main results in the paper appear to be dependent on the complete spillover assumption. the idea that a regulator must allow the regulated¯rm to fund its activities, i.e., the regulated¯rm will only accept a price cap if the expected pro¯t is non-negative. If it is accepted, the incumbent is locked in, that is, the incumbent must operate the network in the industry in both periods and provide access to new entrants if they wish. Finally, the regulated¯rm has a common and¯xed cost of L > 0 which is necessary for it to operate in either the upstream or downstream market.
In each of the two periods, a sequence of moves take place: (i) one of the potential entrants arrives at the market, (ii) the regulator sets an access price a i for the current period i = 1; 2, (iii) the arrived¯rm makes an entry decision, (iv) the market reaches the Cournot solution if the Cournot price is below the price cap, p; the¯rms in the market share the market demand D(p) evenly at the price p if the Cournot price is above p, and (v) each¯rm in the market pays a i to the incumbent. Access prices are allowed to be negative. We assume for the purposes of this paper that the market is su±ciently large to ensure that the optimal price cap imposed by the regulator is binding. One of the two potential entrants (i.e., g or b) arrives at the market in period 1 (equal probability of each event) and the other arrives in period 2. There are two arrival contingencies that describe candidates' types in the two periods: one arrival contingency is that the¯rst candidate is g and the second candidate is b, and the other contingency is the reverse. Candidates are referred to as entrants when they actually enter the market. The type of each candidate is known to¯rms in the market when he enters but the type may not be known by the regulator. We consider two possibilities for the regulator's information on the candidates' type. As a benchmark, we consider the case where the regulator observes the¯rm's type on arrival. We then consider the case where the regulator observes the occurrence of entry but not the type of entrants. Access prices can be made contingent upon what the regulator has observed. In the former case, therefore, the regulator has more capacity to control entry by setting access prices contingent upon entrants' types.
In either case, the regulator sets the price cap and access prices to maximise the (3) With a binding price cap the market shares of identically place¯rms in a Cournot equilibrium may not be exactly equal since they lie in a range around the equal market shares case. The closer the price cap is to the unconstrained price the smaller the range. The equal share is the only¯xed sharing rule that is compatible with the Cournot assumption for all market sizes where the price cap is binding and makes this the natural case to employ. Note the complete spillover assumption implies all marginal costs are identical. As noted in footnote 2, in the absence of complete spillovers it would be far harder to determine a natural output assumption. expected level of welfare (i.e. the consumers surplus and the producers surplus) over the two periods. The incumbent and each candidate select their strategy to maximise (expected) surplus over the two periods, which is total revenue in excess of total expense.
There is no discounting. The description of the game is common knowledge and we focus on the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game.
Abusing notation slightly, it is convenient to use g and b to represent the entry of good and bad types, and we use ; to represent no entry. An entry sequenc is an ordered pair, r, in f(g; b; ;) £ (g; b; ;)g and represents a sequence of entry decisions by the two potential entrants in periods 1 and 2. An entry pro¯le is an ordered pair of entry sequences An access pricing strategy is a strategy of the regulator which consists of a price cap p and access prices contingent on the history observable by the regulator. Given an access pricing strategy, we apply a backward induction argument to determine each potential candidate's entry decision for each possible history. Recording the entry decisions that would be realised for each arrival contingency, we derive an entry pro¯le that is a`bestresponse' to the given access pricing strategy. Every entrant in this pro¯le derives nonnegative expected surplus. Note, however, that the fact that a pro¯le is a best-response to an access pricing strategy does not by itself mean that the regulator can induce it using the associated access prices since the incumbent must also derive non-negative expected surplus from the access pricing strategy or else the incumbent would not accepted it in an equilibrium. We say that a pro¯le is incentive compatible at a price cap p if i) it is a best-response to an access pricing strategy whose price cap component is p and ii) the incumbent derives non-negative expected surplus.
The surplus of each producer is de¯ned in the natural way. That is, the surplus of 6 each entrant is the total revenue in excess of total cost including the entry cost F and the access price transfers. The (expected) surplus of the incumbent is total revenue (revenues and access price receipts) minus costs including the common cost L. The producers surplus is the sum of surpluses of all producers and total welfare is the consumers surplus and the producers surplus. Note, once a price cap, p, is accepted, a subgame starts in which the regulator can induce any pro¯le as long as it is a best-response at p. In that subgame, therefore, the regulator will actually implement the pro¯le that generates the highest welfare among all pro¯les that are a best-response at p. This pro¯le is called subgameoptimal at p. Note that given a price cap, the welfare level generated from a pro¯le is not a®ected by the access prices used to induce it, because they are only transfers between producers.
Finally, an entry pro¯le is implementible at p if it is incentive compatible and subgameoptimal at p. The optimal pro¯le that the regulator will implement is the one that generates the highest welfare among all pro¯les that are implementible (at some p).
Complete Information and the First-best
The key instruments that the regulator uses to induce the optimal entry pro¯le are the access prices that transfer payo®s between the producers. In the benchmark case that the regulator observes the type of candidates, she can induce any transfers between producers by using appropriate access prices, as long as every producer has non-negative surplus. In particular, transfers can be made in such a way that every entrant has zero surplus and the incumbent reaps the entire producers surplus. Therefore, an entry pro¯le is incentive compatible at a price cap p if and only if the producers surplus is non-negative at p. If the regulator can commit to an access pricing strategy, she will compare the welfare levels from all pro¯les at the price caps at which they are incentive compatible, and implement the one that generates the highest welfare. We refer to this pro¯le as¯rst-best (implicitly in association with the price cap that generates the highest welfare).
Note that we have not considered subgame-optimality in de¯ning the¯rst-best. When commitment is not possible as is the case in our model, therefore, the¯rst-best is not necessarily implementible because it may not be subgame-optimal at the associated price cap. We show later that this problem does not arise in the benchmark case: the¯rst-best is in fact subgame-optimal and therefore, the regulator will implement it. First, we identify 7 the¯rst-best.
The relative performance of entry pro¯les (hence, the¯rst-best) varies depending on the parameter value of c and F . Given a`cost con¯guration' (c; F ) in (0; 1) £ IR + we say that an entry pro¯le A dominates another pro¯le A 0 at p, if the welfare from A exceeds the welfare from A 0 at the price cap p. The next results identify several entry pro¯les that are always dominated.
Lemma 3.1: Given any cost con¯guration (c; F ) and price cap p,
(ii) f(g; ;); r Sketch proof: Obviously (g; ;) generates a larger producers surplus than (g; b)
because the second period entry b incurs the entry cost F without lowering cost of production. Since the consumers surplus depends only on the price cap (not the pro¯le), part (i) follows. Analogous arguments establish parts (ii) and (iii). Q.E.D.
An entry pro¯le is not¯rst-best for any (c; F ) if it is always dominated by another pro¯le. Lemma 1 shows the pro¯les that may survive this dominance test are the four pro¯les of the form f(g; ;); r 0 g and the null pro¯le f(;; ;); (;; ;)g, which we denote as:
A 0 = f(;; ;); (;; ;)g
By Lemma 1 we need only consider these¯ve pro¯les and it turns out that the ranking of each pro¯le is determined by its consumers surplus since the optimal solution will provide zero pro¯t to entrants and zero expected pro¯t to the incumbent. That is, each pro¯le is implemented most e±ciently with the lowest price cap at which the pro¯le is incentive compatible, because the producers surplus from any higher price cap would be more than o®set by the reduction in consumers surplus due to a`deadweight loss'. So, the optimal 8 price cap for pro¯le A i , denoted by p i , is the smallest solution to the following equations: Since a lower price cap means higher consumers surplus, the¯rst-best for a given (c; F ) is the entry pro¯le A i whose optimal price p i is the lowest among all¯ve viable pro¯les. . Where entry costs are high and there is a signi¯cant di®erence in quality between the good and bad¯rm the optimal strategy is to allow nothing other than entry by the good¯rm in the¯rst period. If the good¯rm does not arrive until later then the costs of entry make it ine±cient for it to enter since there is only one period of bene¯t from the entry of the good¯rm. As the¯xed entry cost falls then it becomes sensible to allow more entry. If the production cost of the bad¯rm is close to the good¯rm then the optimal strategy is to make the¯rst¯rm enter whether good or bad. Conversely, if the production cost of the bad¯rm, c, is closer to the incumbent than the good¯rm then the optimal strategy is to make the good¯rm enter whether it arrives¯rst or second and to prevent the bad¯rm in all situations. Finally, if the costs of entry are low then it becomes sensible to force entry of either¯rm in the¯rst period and to force entry of the good¯rm if it arrives later.
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The purpose of this section is to outline the case where the regulator has complete information. She would implement the¯rst-best if it is subgame-optimal but this is not guaranteed: once the incumbent accepts the optimal price cap for the¯rst-best pro¯le and lock himself in, the regulator may induce another pro¯le that generates a higher welfare but incurs a loss to the incumbent. In this case, the incumbent would anticipate this and reject the price cap and the¯rst-best pro¯le would not be implementible. It turns out that this problem does not arise in the complete information regime: since any pro¯le can be induced in such a way that the incumbent reaps the whole producers surplus, a pro¯le that dominates the¯rst-best in the subgame would be incentive compatible at the same price from the beginning and hence, would be preferred by the regulator (see Section A.2 in the Appendix for details). Therefore, the¯rst-best will be indeed implemented by the regulator.
Theorem 1: If the regulator observes the types of entrants, she will implement thē rst-best pro¯le for each (c; F ) at the minimum price cap that satis¯es incentive compatibility.
Proof: See Appendix, in particular, Section A.2.
Incomplete Information.
We now consider the case where the regulator is unable to identify which¯rm has arrived in each period and so cannot make the access pricing rule a function of the type of entry. It can, of course, be a function of entry which is observable by the regulator. If the regulator could still implement all¯ve of the viable pro¯les as considered in the previous section the optimal access pricing and its welfare implication would remain the same.
Although there are some pro¯les that can be implemented in the same way, the inability to observe the types of entrants generally restricts the regulator's capacity to control entry using access pricing. This implies that some entry pro¯les are implemented less e±ciently because producers surplus cannot be extracted fully while some other pro¯les cannot be implemented at all because the right incentives cannot be provided.
The complication for the regulator is that either of the two¯rst candidates, once entered, will face the same revenues and access prices. There are two consequences:
(a) One is that if the regulator wishes to accommodate b in the¯rst period and sets access prices accordingly, then g must also be accommodated in the same way if it arrives¯rst even though g will enter at a higher access price. In these cases, the g entrant necessarily enjoys a positive pro¯t, i.e., \informational rent", which arises because of the incomplete information. This implies that such pro¯les cannot display zero expected surplus for g.
Pro¯les such as A 3 are now far more expensive to implement.
(b) If the regulator wishes to encourage g to enter in the second period then it cannot stop b from also entering (in the second period) once g has entered. This follows from the complete spillover assumption: although b's entry does nothing to reduce production costs, b's production costs on entry will immediately fall to zero since g is already in the market. This means that the pro¯le A 4 is no longer implementible. Either A 4 must be replaced with the existing pro¯les (such as A 2 or A 3 ) or an alternative pro¯le
which recognises that r 0 = (b; g) implies r = (g; b). It is straightforward to verify that among the pro¯les that always dominated under complete information as per Lemma 3.1, A 5 is the only that ceases to be so under incomplete information (because A 4 is no longer implementible and hence, is eliminated from consideration).
It is obvious that the null pro¯le A 0 can be implemented in the¯rst-best way without observing the¯rms' type. The same is true for the pro¯les A 1 and A 2 : since entry by b need be discouraged, the desired entries can be implemented via self-selection without incurring informational rent. So, the welfare level in the¯rst-best regions for these three pro¯les is una®ected by the inability to observe the entrant's type. Given that the pro¯le A 3 is more costly to implement and A 4 cannot be implemented then this provides the intuition for the following result.
Lemma 4.1: Under incomplete information, the regulator will implement A 0 ; A 1 and A 2 in the¯rst-best way in the regions in which they are¯rst-best. In addition, A 1 and A 2 are optimal pro¯les to implement for some (c; F ) outside their¯rst-best regions.
The¯rst-best cannot be achieved for con¯gurations (c; F ) for which A 3 or A 4 is¯rst-best: the optimal pro¯le to implement is the one that generates the highest welfare subject to incentive compatibility and subgame-optimality under incomplete information. Figure   2 illustrates a typical pattern of the optimal entry pro¯les under incomplete information.
The broken lines indicate the regions from Figure 1 . In the light of Lemma 4.1, to justify Figure 2 we need to examine the optimal pro¯les for for con¯gurations (c; F ) for which A 3 or A 4 is¯rst-best, referred to as the \ine±cient area."
A 3 is implementible but at a price cap above the optimal one, p 3 , due to informational rent; A 4 is no longer implementible at all and A 5 need be considered instead.
For A 3 = h(g; ;); (b; ;)i, the maximum possible transfer from each entrant to the incumbent (as access price payments over the two periods) is (p ¡ c)D(p) ¡ F , the revenue of b in excess of F , wherep is the e®ective price cap. Then, the incumbent's incentive constraint is
which obviously implies that the price cap must be higher than 3c=4. Recall from (A.1) that W 3 (p) achieves its unconstrained maximum at p = c=2 and decreases monotonically for p > c=2. So, the optimal price cap that maximizes W 3 subject to (4.1) is the lowest one that satis¯es (4.1), which we denote by p and, as before, the optimal price cap that maximizes W 5 subject to (4.2) is the lowest one that satis¯es (4.2), which we denote by p 5 ¤ . Because A 3 and A 5 perform worse than the¯rst-best in the ine±cient area, we need to consider other pro¯les as well to determine the optimal one. Pro¯les A 0 ; A 1 and A 2 may not be implementible at their optimal price cap p i in this area, because A i may not be subgame-optimal at p i . For each (c; F ), the range of price caps for which the pro¯les are subgame-optimal are calculated in the same way as in Section A.2 of the Appendix (because it is determined by the total surplus, not by its distribution, from the pro¯les implementible in the subgame) except that we now compare A 0 » A 3 and A 5 : At (c; F ), the subgame-optimal pro¯le forp is
To¯nd the optimal pro¯le in the ine±cient area, we need to consider subgameoptimality (4.3) simultaneously with incentive compatibility: (4.1) for A 3 , (4.2) for A 5 , and (3.1) for A 0 » A 2 with the equality replaced with¸, which we denoted by (3.1'). For given (c; F ), each pro¯le A i is in one of three kinds of status:
exceeds the upper bound of the subgameoptimal range of price caps for A i as speci¯ed in (4.3), so that A i is not implementible.
. The optmal price cap belongs to the subgame-optimal range of price caps for A i , so that A i is optimally implementible at the optimal price cap.°.
The optimal price cap is below the lower bound of the subgame-optimal range of price caps for A i , so that A i is sub-optimally implementible at the lower bound of the range.
(4)
Now we are ready to determine the optimal pro¯le in the ine±cient area: for each (c; F ), we¯nd the pro¯les that are implementible (optimally or sub-optimally) and compare the welfare levels from them. According to (4.3), A 2 is eligible for an optimal pro¯le only if c¸1 2 and A 3 is eligible only if c · Note that, being¯rst-best at F = F 24 (c), both A 2 and A 4 are subgame-optimal at the optimal price cap p
), the second equality of which follows from (A.5). at F h where
The range of price caps for which A 5 is subgame-optimal is 0 ·p · D ¡1 (
2F 1¡c
).
Because incentive compatibility is harder to satisfy for A 5 than for A 4 , we have p
) and so p 5 is not implementible (status ®). As F falls from F 24 (c) to 0, p 5 ¤ decreases and, therefore, A 5 becomes optimally implementible at F = F`and stays so for F < F`where
Proof: To show F`< F h , we take
as a reference point. Note that
In addition, since A 2 is incentive compatible at the price cap D ¡1 (
1¡c ) when F = F 24 (c), so it is at the same price cap when F is lower, in particular, when F = and, therefore,
< F < F 24 (c). We show that this provision indeed holds.
Pick any F 0 strictly between
and
Since p 2 (c; F 24 (c)) = p 4 (c; F 24 (c)) and the LHS of (3.1) is quasiconcave, we have
) from (4.4) side by side, we get
where the second inequality holds because
On the other hand, because c¸1 2 , (2p
where the last two inequalities can be veri¯ed, respectively, from (4.2) and (4.5) and from 2F 0 > F 24 (c). This means that incentive compatibility for p 2 (the third equation of (3.1) with the equality replaced by¸) is satis¯ed as a strict inequality at p
For F`< F · F 24 (c), A 2 is obviously optimal because A 5 is not implementible. For
A 2 is also implementible but at the price cap
). Since A 2 and A 5 are equivalent as subgame-optimal pro¯les at D ¡1 ( 2F 1¡c ), it follows that A 5 generates higher welfare at its optimal price capp 5 ¤ and hence, is optimal. So, the boundary between the optimal regions for A 2 and A 5 is f(c; F`) :
) falls and hence, F`falls. As c tends to 1,
) tends to 0 and hence, F`tends to 0. This justi¯es the partition structure of Figure 2 for c¸1 2 .
The partition structure for c < 1 2 can be justi¯ed by an analogous analysis and we sketch it here. As before, we¯x c < 1 2 and divide the horizontal segment 0 · F · F 13 (c) according to the status of A 1 , A 3 and A 5 (A 0 performs worse than A 1 in this area).
At F = F 13 (c), the optimal price cap p 1 coincides with the lower bound of the price caps for which A 1 is subgame-optimal. Therefore, A 1 is optimally implementible at F = F 13 (c), but for F < F 13 (c) it is sub-optimally implementible at the price cap D ¡1 ( F 2(1¡c) ). Pro¯le A 3 is not implementible for F = F 13 (c). As F falls it switches the status to being optimally implementible, atF h where the optimal price cap p 3 coincides with the upper bound of the price cap range for which A 3 is subgame-optimal:
As F falls still further, A 3 switches the status again to being sub-optimally implementible, atF`where the optimal price cap coincides with the lower bound of the range:
As for A 5 , as F falls from F 13 (c), it switches the status from being not implementible to being optimally implementible, atF m where the optimal price cap p 5 ¤ coincides with the upper bound of price caps for which A 5 is subgame-optimal:
0 ·F m · F 13 (c) and
The following relationship can be veri¯ed: From the above, the boundary between the optimal regions for A 1 and A 3 is f(c;F h ) : 0 < c < This is the sense in which we suggest that the inability to identify good and bad potential entrants will encourage a regulator to be less supportive of potential entry.
Once the regulator has incomplete information then the incentives become complex.
Here we present intuitive arguments for two of these. One that better solutions exist but they are time inconsistent.
(5) Second, that the good¯rm will often have incentives to raise their cost, i.e., become a less good competitor. We will cover these in turn.
Proposition 1 : For some con¯gurations (c; F ) there exists an entry pro¯le that exhibits higher welfare than the optimal one, but is not time consistent, i.e., not subgameoptimal.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As¯rst-best pro¯les A 2 and A 3 are equivalent at the boundary between the corresponding regions. With incomplete information the welfare value of A 2 is una®ected (since b does not appear). However, in the presence of incomplete information there is a positive rent enjoyed by the good¯rm and so welfare is lower in A 3 compared to the complete information regime. It follows that there must be an abrupt drop at the boundary between the optimal regions for A 2 and A 3 when there is incomplete information. For values of c lower than but 'close' to 1/2, pro¯le A 2 will generate a higher level of welfare than pro¯le A 3 . However, A 2 cannot be implemented for such a value of c because it is not subgame-optimal: That is, whatever the level of the price cap, once it is set the regulator¯nds A 3 a better pro¯le to induce than A 2 .
Implementing A 2 rather than A 3 at this price cap would generate an insu±cient return to the incumbent. Realising this, the incumbent will only accept price caps that are su±ciently high to generate enough return to the incumbent when A 3 is induced.
Proposition 2: For some con¯gurations (c; F ) the good¯rm has an incentive to raise its production cost, i.e., to become a less good (but still better than the other) competitor.
The intuition for this result follows from the discussion of Proposition 1. The good rm earns an information rent in A 3 that it does not earn in A 2 . At the border of A 2 and (5) The e®ect here is akin to the conventional incomplete contracts problem, e.g., Grout (1984) , Hart (1995) and Hart and Holmstrom (1987) .
A
3 the good¯rm has a discrete bene¯t from being in A 3 rather than A 2 . The boundary between these two regions is determined by c, the relative position of the production cost of the bad¯rm to those of the good¯rm and the incumbent. The pro¯t of the good¯rm increases as the bad¯rm improves its position relative to the good¯rm. At the boundary of A 3 and A 2 the good¯rm can change the relative position of itself compared to the bad¯rm by raising its own production cost. Thus the good¯rm has apparently perverse incentives when the regulator has incomplete information. Analogous incentives exist at the boundary between A 5 and A 2 , and between A 3 and A 1 .
The LHS of (A.2) has a negative value at p = 0 and increases as p increases at least up 
We now prove part (a) by verifying (A.4). Note that i) (¹ e j ¡ ¹ e i )F < (¹ e j ¡ ¹ e i )F ij (c),
In conjuction with (A.3), we get
from which we derive (A.4) because (2p . We do this for the case that F 01 , F 12 , F 13 , F 24 and F 34 exist for all relevant c. This case generates the prototype partition structure of the¯rst-best regions. In Section A.3 we discuss possible variations in the partition when some of F ij above do not exist. Proof: (a) The optimal price cap p 0 for A 0 is a constant. Since p 0 also solves the second equation of (3.1) at (c; F 01 (c)), part (a) follows easily.
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(b) Letp be the common solution to the second and third equations of (3.1) at F 12 (c).
Multiply the former equation by 2 and subtract the latter side by side to verify thatp is a solution to (2p¡1:5)D(p) = L. In fact,p is the smallest solution to this equation: otherwisê p would not be the smallest solutions to the second and third equations of (3.1), either.
Obviously,p is independent of c, andp < p 0 follows from (2p ¡ 2)D(p) < (2p ¡ 1:5)D(p). Now, by taking di®erences between the second and third equations of (3.1), note F 12 (c) = D(p). So, F 12 (c) is a constant. Furthermore, F 12 < F 01 : the value of the LHS of the second equation of (3.1) atp is F 12 =2 + L which is lower than that at p 0 , namely We use these lemmas to verify Figure 1 It is straightforward to verify from (A.5) that for each (c; F ) the¯rst-best pro¯le is indeed subgame-optimal at the optimal price. We show this for A 2 here. Exactly analogous arguments work for other pro¯les.
Consider (c; F ) for which A 2 is¯rst-best, that is, c¸1 2 and F 24 (c) · F · F 12 (c). ). In conjuction with (A.6), p 2 (c; F ) is in the range speci¯ed in (A.5) for which A 2 is subgame-optimal.
A.3. Variations of the partition structure
We justi¯ed the¯rst-best partition in Figure 1 for the case that all relevant F ij (c) exist. In this case, the graph of F ij (c) forms the boundary between A i and A j . If this is not the case, the parition structure is altered but the main features are retained.
Consider F 24 (c) for example. F 24 (c) necessarily exists for su±ciently high c < 1, converging to F 24 (1) = 0. For lower c, however, it may happen that p 4 (c; F ) exists precisely when F is not too large, say F · G 4 (c), and whenever it exists it undercuts p 2 (c; F ), in which case F 24 (c) does not exist. Suppose this is the case for c <ĉ whereĉ >
